Chapter 4.        Part C 

       Other than rationalizations, the rationalists have nothing to offer.

               

      What in heaven's name are Plato's ideal "forms"? Can I measure one? Weigh one? If I claim to know the "forms" and you claim to know them, how might we figure out whether the "forms" you know are the same ones that I know? If, in a perfect dimension somewhere, there is a form of a perfect horse, what were eohippus and mesohippus, who were horsing around long before anything Plato could have recognized as a "horse" existed?

   Similarly I have to ask: What are Descartes' "clear and distinct ideas". “Clear and distinct” to whom? Him? His contemporaries? They do not seem to me to be so clear and distinct that I can base my thinking on them and thus stake my sanity and survival on them. I know that there are many people now living and many who have lived who do not, or did not, know what he was talking about. Not in any language. Yet they were, and are, fully human people. Many of Descartes’ favorite “clear and distinct ideas”, namely the basic ideas of arithmetic and geometry, are unknown in some cultures.

               

       This evidence suggests very strongly to me that Descartes' categories are simply not that "clear and distinct". If they were inherently obvious to all human minds, all humans would develop with these ideas built in, a point first noted by Locke. Looking at a lot of humans, especially ones in other cultures, tells us that Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas are not built in. We acquire them by learning them; we are not born with them built in. To me, arguing that they are somehow real, and that, in the meantime sensory experience is illusory, is a way of thinking that can then be extended to arguing for the realness of the creations of fantasy writers. Tolkien describes ents and orcs, and I go along with the fantasy for as long as it amuses me, but there are no ents, however much I may enjoy imagining them.

        J.R.R. Tolkien

               

       On the contrary, all concepts are merely mental models that help us to organize our memories in useful ways, ways that make it easier for us to plan and then act. Even ideas of numbers, Descartes' favorite “clear” ideas, are merely mental tools that are more useful than “ents”. Counting things helps us to act more strategically in the material world and thus to survive. Imagining ents gives us temporary amusement - not a bad thing, though not nearly as useful as an understanding of numbers.

  But numbers, like ents, are mental constructs. In reality, there are never two of anything. No two people are exactly alike, nor are two trees, two rocks, two rivers, or two stars. So then what are we actually counting? We are counting approximate conceptions built up from memories of experiences. Concepts far more useful in the survival game than the concept of an ent. And even those concepts that seem to be built into us (e.g. basic language concepts) are built in because over generations of evolution of the human genome, those concepts have given a survival advantage to their carriers. Language enables teamwork; teamwork works. Thus, as a physically explainable phenomenon, the human capacity for language also comes back into the fold of empiricism. 

   Geneticists can locate the genes that enable a developing embryo to build a language center in the future child's brain. And later, perhaps, MRI scanning can find the place in your brain where your "language program" is located, and, if you have a tumor there, a neuro-surgeon may be able to fix the "hardware" so a speech therapist can then help you to fix the program. The human capacity for language is an empirical phenomenon all the way down. (2.)  

  

    In the meantime, counting enabled more effective hunter-gatherer behavior. If the leader of the tribe knew that he had seen eight of the things his people called "deer" go into an area of what they called "bush", and if only seven had come out, he could calculate that if his friends caught up and circled around in time, and if they could execute well, work as a team, and kill, this week the children would not starve. Both the ability to count things, and the ability to articulate detailed instructions, boosted a primitive tribe’s odds of surviving. 

    Thus were the rudiments of arithmetic and language built up in us. And if the pre-cursors of language seem to be genetically built-in (human toddlers all over the world grasp that nouns are different from verbs, for example), while the pre-cursors of math are not, this fact would only indicate that basic language concepts are far more valuable in the survival game than basic math ones are. It would not indicate that either basic language concepts or basic arithmetic concepts are coming to us by some mysterious, inexplicable process out of the ideal dimension of the pure Good.

   

   We do not have to believe – as the Rationalists say we do – in another dimension of pure thought, with herds of “forms” or “distinct ideas” roaming its plains, in order to have confidence in our own ability to reason. By nature or by nurture, or subtle combinations of the two, we acquire and pass on to our kids those concepts that enable their carriers to survive. In short, reason’s roots can be explained in ways that don’t assume any of the things that Rationalism assumes.

       And now, Rationalism’s really disturbing implications start to occur to us. Wouldn't I love to believe that there is some hidden dimension in which the "forms" exist, perfect and eternal? Of course, I would. Then I would "know" that I was "right". Then I and a few simpatico acquaintances might agree among ourselves that we were the only people truly capable of perceiving the finer things in life or of recognizing which are the truly moral acts. Our training and our natural gifts have sensitized us; we are able to detect the beautiful and the good. For us to persuade the ignorant masses would be nothing more than rational. Considering how incapable they really are, why it would be an act of mercy! Quality people do exist. Of course, they do. 

          This view is not just theoretically possible. It was the view of some disciples of G. E. Moore almost a century ago and, even more blatantly, of some of the followers of Herbert Spencer a generation before that. (Accessible explanations of the views of Moore and Spencer can be found in wikipedia articles online.) (3.) (4.) 

          G.E. Moore

     Herbert Spencer 

         I am being sarcastic about the sensitivity of those aristocrats, of course. Both my studies and my experience of the world tell me that there are more than a few of these kinds of “sensitive” aristocrats roving around in today's world, in every land. (The "neocons" of the West?) We underestimate them at our peril. The worst among them don't like democracy. They yearn to be in charge, they have the brains to get into the positions of authority, and they have the capacity for life-long fixation on a single goal. Then, they have the ability to rationalize their way into sincerely believing that harsh and duplicitous measures are sometimes needed to keep order among the ignorant masses, i.e. everyone else.

           The conclusion that I came to about rationalism, as a young man, was that it was far too often a close companion of totalitarianism. The reason why was not clear to me until I was in my mid-thirties when I learned about cognitive dissonance and how it works and finally figured the puzzle out.

      I see how inclined toward rationalization other people are and how easily, even insidiously, they give in to it. On what grounds can I tell myself that I am above this very human weakness? Shall I tell myself that my mind is somehow more aesthetically and morally aware, or more disciplined, and is, therefore, immune to such self-delusions? I am aware of no logical grounds for that kind of conclusion about myself or anyone else whom I have ever met or whose works I have ever read.

         In addition, evidence which reveals this capacity for rationalization in human minds, even some of the most brilliant of human minds, litters history. How could Duhem, the brilliant French philosopher, have written off Relativity Theory just because a German proposed it? (In 1905, Einstein was thought of as, and thought of himself as, a German.) How could Heidegger or Heisenberg have endorsed the Nazi's propaganda? The "Fuehrer" principle. "German Science" yet!! Ezra Pound, arguably the best literary mind of his time, on Italian radio defending the Fascists! Decent people today recoil and even despair.

       George Bernard Shaw

Jean-Paul Sartre      

    How could George Bernard Shaw or Jean-Paul Sartre have become apologists for Stalinism? So many brilliant minds falling into this same trap. We have to wonder how so many geniuses of the academic, scientific, and artistic realms could have made such mistakes in the practical, everyday one. Once we understand how cognitive dissonance reduction works, the answer is painfully obvious. Brilliant thinkers are just as brilliant at self-comforting thinking – namely rationalizing – as they are at clear, critical thinking. And the most brilliant specious terms and fallacious arguments that they construct (i.e. the most convincing lies that they tell) are the ones that they tell themselves. Yes, even these brilliant minds! Look at the evidence!

     The most plausible, cautious, and responsible reasoning that I can apply to myself leads me to conclude that the ability to reason skillfully in abstract, formal terms has been a guarantee of nothing in the realm of practical affairs. Brilliance with formal thinking systems has been just as quick to advocate for totalitarianism and tyranny as it has for pluralism and democracy. We are going to have to work out a moral code that counters at least the worst excesses of the human flaw called “rationalization”, especially the forms found in the most intelligent of human beings if we want to survive. 

Notes 

2. Stark-Vance, Virginia and Mary Louise Dubay; "100 Questions      and Answers About Brain Tumors"; Josh and Bartlett Publishers;    2011.

3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G.e._Moore

4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Spencer