Chapter 14 Western Worldviews Till The
Renaissance
Every society must
work out and articulate a view of the physical universe, a way of seeing the
world, a way that then becomes the base on which the society’s values and culture will
be built. This is no minor issue; philosophers may dally over the matter in a
theoretical way; real folk have to deal with life. They have to have some code
in place that helps them decide, individually and collectively, how to live.
Worldview, values, and behaviors then form a coherent system under which each
individual is able to make decisions and act so that the entire society can efficiently
operate, cooperate, and survive in its always-changing, demanding environment.
Software directs how hardware runs. In real life, the hardware (humans) must
run if the whole society/culture is to deal with reality. My body has to move
around in physical reality to get food, raise kids, avoid lions, etc.
All societies know
this in a deep way. Societies up until our time have integrated their
worldviews, values, and morés thoroughly because people everywhere knew
implicitly that their worldview was their guide when they were trying to decide,
minute by minute, whether an act that felt morally right was practicable. Can
what I believe I should do actually be done? My worldview leads me to my
answer. No one aims to achieve what she truly believes cannot exist.
This is hard thinking
we’re embarking on. Therefore, before we begin to build our new system, we need
to get our thinking into an analytical mindset. We need to consider the salient
peaks in the histories of some societies of the past, in order to see how their
worldviews, values, and behaviors worked. Get used to thinking in the terms,
axioms, premises, and methods of cultural evolution.
In the scientific
study of Moral Philosophy, History is our data bank. From studying History, we
get insights into how our societies work, and from the insights, we form models/theories.
Then, we also find in History the evidence against which we may test our
theories. Always, it is observable evidence that confirms or disconfirms any theory,
including our theory of cultural evolution.
G.W.F. Hegel (artist: Jakob
Schlesinger, via Wikimedia Commons)
In this chapter,
Philosophy students will notice parallels between aspects of my philosophy and
that of Hegel. I admit freely that similarities exist. But I also have some
major points of disagreement with Hegel. For those readers who are not
Philosophy students, please note that I will give only a very quick version of
my understanding of one part of Hegel’s philosophy. If you find the ideas
presented here interesting, you really should give Hegel a try. His writing is
difficult, but not impossible, and it has also been interpreted by some
disciples who write more accessibly.1
Now back to our
analysis of the worldviews, concepts, values, customs, morés, and behavior
patterns that are discernible in the history of the societies of the West. Why
Western societies? Because I know a little more of their histories than I know of the histories of societies of the East or the developing world. But the
methods I use in analyzing the West are applicable to all societies.
So. How have Western
societies of the past begun, evolved, changed, and, sometimes, died out? Let’s look at a
few.
“Saturn devouring one of his children”
(Goya) (credit: Wikimedia Commons)
For instance, let’s
consider the ancient Greeks, the ones who came long before Socrates’ time. They
portrayed the universe as an irrational, dangerous place. To them, the gods who
ran the universe were capricious, violent, and cruel, a phrase which also
described the Greeks’ worldview. Under this view, humans could only cringe
fearfully when facing the gods’ testy humors. Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Ares,
Hades, Athena, Apollo, and the rest were lustful, cruel, and
unpredictable. Zeus wielded thunderbolts, Poseidon, earthquakes, Apollo,
plagues. The Greeks knew the gods could punish. Over and over, if they wished to.
But as individuals
experimented with new ways, Greek culture evolved. A few individuals attracted
a group of followers who multiplied when their set of new beliefs and ways
worked. By the Periclean Age, a few daring Greek plays were showing people how
to defy the gods. After all, under their evolving worldview, they had been
given the divine gift of fire by their patron, Prometheus.
As the Greek worldview
– with its attached system of values – evolved, it guided them toward a
smarter, braver lifestyle. They began trying to explain reality in ways that
made room for people to take effective action, understand and control events in
the world, not cringe before them. Once their worldview included such
possibilities, they began to create action plans that enabled them to cause,
hasten, or forestall more and more events in the world. They tried out the
action plans. Early forms of maps, mining, cranes, gears, underground water
pipes, and roof trusses all came in these times. When some daring ideas worked,
more followed. (Edith Hamilton articulates this idea well.2)
It is important to
also note here, however, that human individuals and groups normally will not
attempt any action they think of as “taboo”. The majority of the ancients who
happened upon an action that seemed contrary to, or outside of, what in their
worldview was appropriate for humans only grew upset and fearful. Whether the
action got results or not, the thing the less-daring people wanted to learn was
how to avoid putting themselves in that situation again. They sought to avoid
it for fear of bringing the gods’ wrath down on them. But taboos got tested now
and then when a genius questioned society’s worldview, or even described an
alternative. Sadly, he often paid dearly for his audacity by being ostracized
or killed. Like Socrates.
Taboos are usually
few in number, but they are not things to be toyed with. For example, in
Ancient Egypt, if you questioned the custom of burying a dead man with food,
sandals, jewels, and gold, or worse yet, if you robbed a tomb of such contents,
you could be put to death by any of several means: decapitation, drowning,
burning, etc. Every society has at least a few taboos. The existence of taboos
only shows how subtle cultural evolution is. Like biological evolution, it
contains nuances and sub-routines. But mostly, cultures still must either
evolve or die. Like living species. Mostly, it’s geniuses that enable us to do
so.
Euripides, Greek tragic playwright
(credit:
Marie-Lan Nguyen, via Wikimedia Commons)
However, changes in a society’s worldview and then in the society’s values and morés can also evolve more gradually, helped by many lesser geniuses. The Greeks had both kinds of geniuses. By the Golden Age of Athens, these people were offering works that a few centuries earlier would have been unthinkable. Their worldview had evolved to allow for more human freedom. The works of Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, Euripides, and Pythagoras were produced under a worldview in which humans could conceive of actions challenging the old beliefs and even the gods. They made later men like Archimedes, possible.
The challenge might
only rarely succeed, but once it did, it drew followers – if it worked. Some of
the new, different beliefs and ways made life better.
Spartan woman giving a shield to her son
(credit: Le
Barbier, via Wikimedia Commons)
At the same time,
their neighbors, the Spartans, were evolving a very different society, a
perfect military state. The Peloponnesian War became inevitable, and Athens
lost. A few years later, the Macedonians out-did the Spartans. After a few
generations, the Romans, with even better military technologies and more
resolute armies, ended the matter by conquering them all.
In each case, one
culture’s worldview, values, and set of behavior patterns – all integrated into
a system – was tried against one of that culture's neighbors, and proved more
vigorous. This cultural evolution kept bringing new human social systems to the
top. This whole picture of History is harsh, but real.
Note also how
cultural evolution works by variation and selection of memes rather than genes.
This mode of evolution appears tenuous, even shaky, but it is much faster and
more responsive to change than is evolution by the genetic mode. We can adapt
to changes in weather patterns and grow a new kind of crop to eat because we
can watch a climate change, form concepts, build new mental models of reality, then
action plans, then implement them. Or new weapons and tactics. Or ways of
curing diseases. We can update a way of life. And humans do these things in a
generation or two, which does not seem really fast, but is much faster, comparatively, than evolution
by the genetic mode. The memetic mode of evolution is our way, the human way. In
a comparatively short time span, a few tribes in Greece, between Homer and Plato,
re-wrote their way of life.
Thus, in Western
history, the next important worldview is the Roman one. Operating under it,
people became much less cerebral than the Greeks, more practical, more focused
on physical effectiveness and power, and less interested in ideas for their own
sake. Among many of the early Romans, this feeling often expressed itself in a
hatred of all things Greek. The truth was that though they didn’t like to admit
it, the Romans borrowed a lot from the Greeks, especially in art and theoretical
knowledge. Greek science and geometry enabled the building of the engineering
marvels the Romans constructed. But the Romans didn’t discuss whether there
were pure forms beyond this world (as Plato did).
In their heyday, the
Romans no longer feared the gods in the way the ancient Greeks or the Romans’
own ancestors once had. As the Republic faded and the Empire took over, the
Romans turned so far from Greek thinking that they lost much of the Athenian
capacity for abstract things – philosophical speculation, pure geometry, ideals
of democracy, and flights of imagination.
The Romans built
their state on abstract democratic principles, values, and behaviors, similar
to the Athenians, but like the Spartans, they loved far more the real-world
results and the physical power some ideas could lead them to. They cared little for
speculation about “the one and the many” or where parallel lines meet. Those
were Athenian mind games that, to the Romans, seemed silly. It is also
worth mentioning that the early Romans had ideals of their own, which were not
philosophical but, instead, political. They dearly loved their city, and its method
of governance. They believed Rome had been picked by the gods for a special
destiny. (Their ideas about their country and themselves were similar to what
Americans today call “American exceptionalism”.)
It’s tempting to see
Roman culture as a synthesis of the ways of the Athenians and those of the
Spartans. This is an example of Hegel’s “dialectic”: one way of thinking, a
thesis, along with the human groups that gather around it, forms and grows, and
then an opposite way of thinking, an antithesis, rises up like a kind of cosmic
response to the first way. The two interact, struggle, and finally meld into a
synthesis, which is not a compromise because it is a new, complete, coherent way with a
life of its own. Thesis, anti-thesis, and then synthesis. That’s Hegel.
The people born into
the new way are not aware they are using some elements from one worldview and
some from another. The new way is simply their way, and they add ideas to it
till it is a seamless whole. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis, over and over, with
the system spiralling ever upward to greater and greater consciousness. This is
Hegel’s model of human social evolution.
It is tempting.
It is a fairly simple model, and with a little stretching it can be made to
seem to fit in era after era and country after country in History. But it is
too simple. The Roman way of thinking did contain some ideals similar to those
of both the Athenians and the Spartans, but we know today that there was much
else going on in the thinking and lifestyles of the Romans. Constant
experimenting in construction, agriculture, war, medicine, etc.
The Romans came into
power in the ancient world by a culture that was their own, evolved over
generations of farmers who had banded together to protect their farms and their
families. They built a city as a fortress that would facilitate this goal. The
Romans weren’t Atheno-Spartans. They were alien to all the
Greeks. Like foxes introduced into the Australian environment by Europeans. They
were, more accurately, a society that contained some elements like the Athenians
and some like the Spartans, and some that were their own. But they were far
more just a new experiment coming from outside of the Greek system, one capable
of beating any Greek army that came against them. In short, real cultures in
History are more complex than Hegel's model.
What makes more sense
is to examine each society’s worldview, values, morés, and behavior patterns
and observe how they coordinate to produce a culture and way of life that meets
the citizens’ survival needs at the time. To see human cultures like we do species
in the natural world with their infinite numbers of variations and ways of
surviving, and unpredictable arrivals and departures. In order to survive,
species change their anatomies, physiologies, programmed behavior, etc..
Cultural evolution uses analogous devices. Under this view, we can learn much
more about how human societies really work. Then, maybe, in modern times, we
can finally get control of the process. This is our one hope.
The model of human
cultural evolution presented in this book doesn’t attempt to be as neat as Hegel’s thesis-antithesis-synthesis model simply because cultural evolution is more complex than that. Cultural evolution is more
closely analogous to the process of evolution in the biological world – by
genetic variation and natural selection. The key difference to see in cultural
evolution is that genetic variations have been replaced with memetic variations.
Both kinds of variations emerge in ways that aren’t syntheses. Like species
changes, cultural changes have emerged in a wide range of ways. They have so
far proved more unpredictable than the Hegel’s model can account for. But our
aim here is to understand cultural evolution, and finally learn how to end war.
Life didn’t move forward through time and
proliferate into its many forms by the mechanism that Hegel describes. In the
past, events like floods, tsunamis, earthquakes, droughts, and even collisions
with giant meteors suddenly closed down, or opened up, reams of opportunities. Life
forms move into new habitats opportunistically. Life spreads across time and
space not in a single path like a chain, but like a bush branching and
bifurcating from that primal trunk of a few cells that came alive eons ago.
Most branches, by far, get cut off.
The model of human
cultural evolution presented in this book can’t match Hegel’s dialectic for
attractiveness. Hegel’s model seems so neat and complete. But both real animal
life and human cultural life are not that neat, not that philosophical. In the
meantime, our models of human culture must be grounded in reality where new ideas
arise in ways that can’t be foreseen. Variations occur that are radical
departures from our past experience.
Genetic evolution has
also, in every species, over millennia, put in many genes that are dominant,
some that are recessive, some genetically inert, and some that are lethal.
Memetic (cultural) evolution contains analogues for all of these, plus others
that we are going to have to analyze and come to understand as they are
presently beyond all our terms, models, analogies, and metaphors. We don’t understand
very well why we do the things we do.
Examples of lethal
genes are ones that used to guarantee at conception that a human born with that
gene in his genotype was going to die (e.g. of sickle cell anemia or cystic fibrosis,
etc.). My position in this book is that there are memes in human cultural codes
that are lethal memes, analogous to lethal genes. Or, more accurately, they
have become lethal as our social environments and meme codes have evolved. For
example, patriarchy is, in my view, such a meme. It produces sexism and
homophobia. The meme that makes us practice and pass on tribalism is also such
a meme. It makes us act out patterns of behavior called “racism” and “war”.
Either we isolate the tribalism meme, or it will end us.
But the model
explored here can do what we need it to do. It can give us insights into how
human cultures and values work. It can enable us to build a rational moral
code. One that retains our vigor, but also maximizes our odds of survival.
In order to achieve
that difficult goal, we must learn to do what Bayesianism suggests. Enhance our
species smartest odds. Enable sense and decency, and repress ignorance and
cruelty. Now, let’s return to constructing our case.
The Romans had a
system that contained more practicality, discipline, and efficiency than the
Athenian one. They built roads, bridges, and aqueducts of great size and
engineering sophistication by employing some of the knowledge they had learned
from the Athenians, some they got from their neighbours, the Tuscans, and some
useful ideas that were the Romans’ own. Similarly, in other areas such as
agriculture, medicine, law, and war, by memetic experimenting and compromise, the
Romans got practical results unmatched in their times.
Etruscan
scenes tomb painting in Tarquinia, Italy
(credit:
Wikimedia Commons)
In addition, it is worth
repeating that the Roman Republic, cruel as it could be to its enemies, was
dearly loved by Romans. They were citizens of a democracy. They were a family.
They truly thought that they deserved to rule because there had never been any
state like Rome. It was specially gifted and destined, chosen by the gods. The
state religion said so. The Aeneid, their national epic, said so.
Thus, the Romans’ worldview assigned to them the most important role in the
history of the world. For generations, the Romans knew the gods loved Rome.
Glory days of ancient Rome (credit: Thomas
Cole, via Wikimedia Commons)
This worldview
produced an Athenian style of idealistic patriotism because it produced a state
that gave democratic rights to all Roman citizens, or at least all “true”
citizens, namely adult Roman males who owned property. There were aristocratic
families, as had been the case in almost all previous states, and these were
accustomed to the idea of privilege. But there were also plebeians, and they
too were full citizens with rights to vote, run for office, have a fair trial
if they were charged with a crime, and so on. These were ideals that existed
above any human individuals. Ideals How could one not love such a country? What would
one not endure for her? The Romans were capable of Athenian types of political ideals,
but cared little about Plato’s “forms”. Instead, Romans loved Rome.
The slave portion of
the Roman population gradually grew till it became half of the people of
southern Italy, but the Romans viewed this situation as the natural order. This
view that superior people must have slaves in order to have time to pursue
nobler ideals and activities, did not originate with the Romans. It had been common
centuries before. Even Aristotle defended it at length for reasons similar to
those that the Romans subscribed to. They accepted, without thinking about it,
that their country’s system made them superior. They deserved to be the masters
of inferior cultures.
Then, sadly, later
generations of Romans got spoiled. They grew to love luxuries and to want more
and more of them. They overtaxed people - by the late Roman Empire, literally to
death. “Provincials” and citizens got fed up and began to cheat on their taxes because
“everyone did”. Bribed officials made it all worse.
As the generations
passed, Rome declined by degrees into a society built on slaves and worldly
pleasures, restrained only by a warrior’s code of loyalty. Patriotic ideals faded.
Rome’s collapse became inevitable when its armies ran out of territories to
conquer. To the North lay frozen wastes, to the South, deserts, to the East,
mountains or more deserts, to the West, endless ocean. They had conquered all
that was worth having. With no strong code to live by, they sank into cynicism,
indulgence, sloth, bribery, envy, and internal wrangling.
In short, the
cultural code of Rome ceased to evolve. It had reached its limit. Its remnants,
still followed doggedly by a few, grew dangerously out of touch with larger
forces in their times, many of which had been produced by the Romans’ own
success. For example, by the late 300’s, nowhere near enough Romans were
volunteering for the army. Military service had come to seem naïve. And for Christians,
it was too worldly. The army had to be filled, more and more, with foreign
mercenaries. As a result, rival tribes learned better ways of making war from
the Romans themselves. At the same time, government officials were becoming
ever more corrupt. All the while, too few in Rome cared. For most of them, their
minds were elsewhere, on worldly pleasures or else on heaven.
As the values of the
old Roman practicality and love for their country declined, they were replaced
not by newer forms of practical values, but by Christian belief in the value of
the life after death and the trivialness of this earthly one.
Like a computer
operating system, a cultural code needs regular updating in order to stay
effective in the natural and social environments it must interface with every
day. Code that doesn’t get updated becomes obsolete as better apps are devised
by competing firms. However, consequences for a society whose code falls out of
touch with reality are more drastic than those felt by a company when its
software no longer competes well in the software market.
By the time the
Romans realized that Rome really could fall, it was too late.
Late
Roman decadence (credit: Thomas Couture, via Wikimedia Commons)
Note how the decline
of the later Romans’ values and their laziness regarding ideals of citizenship
and honesty presaged that fall. Note also how we today understand intuitively
the crucial roles values play in shaping citizens’ lifestyles and, therefore,
in the success of their state. Ideals shape behavior and behavior determines
whether a society rises or falls. We know this relationship at a level so deep
that we take it to be obvious. We grasp implicitly that when the Romans became procrastinating,
hypocritical, and corrupt, the collapse of their state became inevitable. (This
idea comes mostly from Edward Gibbon, whose work on the subject is still,
arguably, the most respected of all time.3)
But values and their
material consequences are not obvious; the relationship between a society’s moral
values, its ways, and its surviving has eluded us for too long. In this era, we
must do better if we are to end war before it ends us.
Conversion of Emperor
Constantine to Christianity
(artist:
Rubens) (credit: Wikimedia Commons)
The next phase in the
history of the West comes with the rise of Christianity. Did Christianity get
strong because it offered Romans a way out of sensuality and materialism, i.e. enabled
them to live by ideal values again? Or did it just happen to coincide with the escape
from cynicism and materialism?
The position of Moral
Realism is that the simultaneous appearance of these two social phenomena is no
coincidence. Changes in values coincide with changes in ways of life because
values changes lead to new patterns of behavior, ones that either help or
hinder a society in its struggle to survive. Neither causes the other. They are
both symptoms of a nation’s experimenting with even deeper changes in its consciousness.
Nations always have at least some experimenting going on in the thinking of the
citizens. Mixing memes. Once in a while, an experiment works. The old values of
Rome decayed. The new Christian ones offered a way out, even though the way out
offered cost the Romans their empire.
The downside of Christianity
was that it told people that the highest state for a human to aspire to is not
citizenship. It is a state of grace, i.e. peace with God. This was easier to
achieve in a monastery or nunnery. Renounce the world in all its tempting
forms; focus on eternity. In the last years of the Roman Empire, balance
between Christian values and Roman ones was hard to find. When the Visigoths’
challenge came, too many Romans had let their ideals decay, in the cases of the
old style, still pagan Romans, or else stray too far from the practical, in the
cases of the Christians. People who had integrated the two value sets, who
could skillfully defend Rome and also live by the Christian moral code, were
too few to stop the barbarian tide. Melding the two was still too complex.
Rome fell, in an
agony that we today cannot imagine. But the challenge was bound to come. The
time from the Romans’ accepting Christianity as the state religion to the
Empire’s fall is six generations – almost nothing in biological evolution’s
terms. It took another thousand years, fifty generations, for Europe to find a
way to synthesize the ideals of citizenship and those of Christianity into one coherent,
practicable way of thinking and living.
Again, Hegel’s model,
does seem to fit. Roughly. But the model I offer in this book will go beyond
Hegel. In our time, we must leave that model because it portrays our species’
cultural evolution as being gradual and involuntary. We have to wrench the
wheel that steers this ship away from instincts and luck and put it into the
hands of our rational, volitional faculties. We have to take over our own cultural
evolution. Hegel doesn’t give us that option.
Under the Christian
worldview, the earth had been specially created by God to house man, his most
beloved creation. But man’s role was not to enjoy life when he could (as the
ancients had). Instead, humans were here to praise God and gratefully accept
all God sent their way, all joy and all suffering. Getting ready for the next
life after death was what mattered. “Memento Mori” (Remember Death) was carved
into a plaster base holding a human skull on every scholar’s desk. This way of
thinking sounds like a backward step, and in many ways, it was. It wasn’t
practical. It focused the attention of many smart people away from matters in
this material world.
The Good
Samaritan (credit: Aimé Morot, via Wikimedia Commons)
But Christianity
added some useful ideas of its own. Christians were taught to act kindly toward
all other people, not just other Romans; to behave honestly and compassionately
in their dealings with others; and to commit in a personal way to Christ’s kind
of faith and his simple, honest, compassionate way of life. Christians were
programmed to live as if being kind to all was the moral way, even if kind
actions might not get any rewards for their doer in this lifetime.
This was a big change
from the ways of the slave-owning, sensual, late Empire Romans. (But gladiatorial
games were banned around 400 A.D.. A big change.)
Why the Church later
became so cynical as to own property and engage in wars, while individual serfs
were not to even contemplate such acts (unless the pope told them to make war
on the heathens) was kept vague. But the emotional grip and social utility of
Christianity’s ideas were so strong that hypocritical Church authorities found
it easy to steer followers’ past the Church’s hypocrisies.
For ten centuries in
Europe, the Church’s explanations of the universe and the human place in it
were enough to attract, build, and retain a large following for the Church and
the values it endorsed. The values, in turn, fostered more honest and diligent
communities, ones that eventually began to get practical results. That was all
that mattered as far as cultural evolution was concerned.
Christian communities
began to enjoy periods of increasing prosperity as their values created more
stability and productivity. Even though they were not very progressive by
modern standards, or by the standards of the glory days of Rome, the later
Middle Ages were a big improvement on the violence and chaos that had come for
several centuries right after the fall of Rome.
The synthesis of
Roman patriotism and Christian compassion, and some new ideas, got more and
more viable as the contradictions were worked out in the minds and daily lives
of ordinary people. Gradually, Europe began to climb its way back toward order
and prosperity. But it did so under a moral operating system very different
from that of the Roman Empire.
At first, the
behaviors Christianity recommended had seemed effete to citizens of the Roman
Empire. Compassion for the indigent was stupid. A good horse was worth a
thousand of them. Who was this Chrestus? What system had he offered that
was luring Roman youth into its cult? The cross as its symbol yet! The cross
was a symbol for losers!
But that system,
which gave moral status to all humans (even serfs had rights), mutual support
through all tribulations (war, famine, and plague), and honesty in all dealings
(God watches us all) proved superior to the Roman one in the final test.
Dissatisfied with what had become the Roman way of life – a life filling up
with pleasures, but also cynicism, more and more people became converts. When
Constantine made Christianity the official faith, he was acknowledging
reality. Christianity had impressed people. It had become popular.
gladiators
in ancient Rome (credit: J. L. Gerome, via Wikimedia Commons)
Christianity offered
something new – a worldview that felt personal, a way of life that made moral sense.
Over the long term, it created efficient communities.
As contemptible as
Christianity seemed to mid-Empire Romans, who cheered themselves hoarse as gladiators
killed each other, it gradually assimilated the old Roman system. The large
point to grasp here is that even though individuals might not be aware of any long-term
trends, Christianity didn’t just sound nice. Over millions of people and
hundreds of years, it worked. It got results.
Christianity’s
otherworldliness caused a decline in the Romans’ practical skills. This loss
kept Europe from growing dominant worldwide until the Renaissance. But finally,
more worldly values that fostered exploration and invention melded with the
Christian beliefs in duty, self-denial, and compassion, and some new ideas.
Then, visible changes, like the Europeans’ “discovery” of the New World and the
rise of Science, gave proof that the new way worked.
In our view in this
book, the view that looks for causes and effects, the Christian way of life, that
required every citizen to respect every other citizen, enabled Western
society’s efficiency level to rise past a critical threshold. A flowering of
Western civilization became inevitable. The new hybrid values system worked:
Greek abstract ideas, Roman practical skills, and some new Renaissance ideas.
The offspring then mated with Christianity. In fifty generations, a functioning
whole emerged, visible, for example, in the cities of the Hanseatic League.
Map showing cities in the Hanseatic League (credit: Wikipedia)
It took over a
thousand years for people whose lives focused on worldly matters, instead of on
seeking salvation in a life after death, to be seen as good Christian folk.
Architects, artists, merchants, explorers, sadly even conquistadores, could do
what they had always done, but now as ways of glorifying God. From the
perspective of the life of a single human being, this transition seems so slow,
but in evolutionary terms, a thousand years is short. Fifty human generations. Some
insects do that in a summer. Some bacteria do it in a week. Under the model of
cultural evolution, humans can’t evolve as fast as insects, but much faster
than they ever could in the days before cultural evolution kicked in.
It’s interesting here
to note the intricacies of the socio-historical process. Even societies that
seem to have reached equilibrium always hold a few individuals who restlessly
test their society’s accepted world view, values, and morés. These people's
followers are often the young, which suggests that adolescent revolt plays a
vital role in the evolution of society. Teenagers make us look at our values
and, once in a long while, they even make us realize that one of our familiar
values is due for overhaul. Or retirement. Surprise. Teenage revolt serves a
crucial purpose in the process of cultural change.
However, it’s more
important to understand that many people in the rest of society see the new
thinkers and their followers as delinquents. Only rarely are they seen as valuable.
It’s even more important to see that the numbers involved on each side don’t
matter. What does matter is: first, whether the new thinkers’ ideas attract at
least a few followers; and second, whether the ideas work, i.e. whether the followers
then live more vigorous lives than the rest of the society.
A society, like any
living thing, needs to be opportunistic, constantly testing and searching for
ways to grow, even though many citizens in its establishment may resent the
means by which it does so and may do everything in their power to quell the
process. Most often, they can. But not always. For Western society, until the
practical features of its ancient world beliefs were integrated with its more
humane Christian ones, Medieval Europeans did not support those in their midst
whose ideas and morés focused on life in this material world.
Artists, scientists,
inventors, explorers, and entrepreneurs are eccentric. They don’t support the
status quo, they threaten it. But they move the rest forward. They flourish only
in a society that tolerates eccentrics. Renaissance culture did.
Gutenberg
inspecting a press proof (circa 1440) (engraving created in 1800’s)
The Glasses Apostle (credit: Conrad von Soest, via Wikimedia Commons)
To flourish, a society
must use resources and grow when it has opportunities to do so, or it will lose
out later when events in the environment grow harsher, competition gets
fiercer, and it has few or no resources banked. How do new, improved ways of
doing things become established ways of doing things? One means is by war, as
has been mentioned. But the peaceful mechanism can also work, and it is seen in
tolerant societies when the people who devise and use new ways are allowed to
do so undisturbed. If they then live better, the majority begins to pay
attention and take up these ways. ("Wow! Eyeglasses work!")
This market-driven
way, if practiced honestly, is the way of peaceful cultural evolution, the
alternative to the war-driven one. Humans have taken a long time to even begin
to grasp and follow the peaceful path, but as a species, we are almost there,
almost to the point of being able to evolve culturally without war.
Now we return to our
main argument. We have already shown that humans must have a general code, usually
called their moral code, to live by, just so they can organize their
communities into teams that can efficiently get food, build shelters, care for
the sick and injured, raise kids, etc. Furthermore, the code that the West has
lived by is due for some major updating. It has not worked very well over the
last century and if it is not updated, it ends in disaster for the whole human
race. We have to have a code in place just to live, but the old one will not
do. The problem for this twenty-first century is to figure out a new code for our
society. What moral code would be rational, i.e. would work, for us all?
What has been
discussed in this chapter is a quick and simplified summary of what Western
civilization has been doing in terms of writing and re-writing its code for the
last few centuries. What has also been shown along the way is that values
endure over generations, if and only if they work, i.e. they create nations
that function well in physical reality over the long haul.
The nations of the
West took a thousand years to integrate Christian tolerance with Greek abstract
thought and Roman practicality, but once Western nations learned to see
commerce, Science, and exploration as ways of glorifying God, material progress
came. Renaissance values worked. ("God loves you when you get things done.")
Western culture surged ahead of all other cultures.
Unfortunately, the
moral code that had produced the success of the West, fell out of touch with
the very wealth and power it had enabled the people of the West to create. But
the ways in which the West’s material progress outstripped its moral progress
will be dealt with later in this book. For now, let’s keep following the
evidence – what really did happen in the West. Once we have described what
happened, then we can begin to account for why it did and begin to plan a
better way to teach to our children.
Notes
1. Matthew Allen
Fox, The Accessible Hegel (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2005).
2. Edith
Hamilton, Mythology: Timeless Tales of Gods and Heroes (New
York, NY: Warner Books, 1999), pp. 16–19.
3. Edward
Gibbon, History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. 1
(1776; Project Gutenberg).
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