Chapter 4. Part C
Other than rationalizations, the rationalists have nothing to offer.
What in heaven's
name are Plato's ideal "forms"? Can I measure one? Weigh one? If I
claim to know the "forms" and you claim to know them, how might we
figure out whether the "forms" you know are the same ones that I
know? If, in a perfect dimension somewhere, there is a form of a perfect horse,
what were eohippus and mesohippus, who were horsing around long before anything
Plato could have recognized as a "horse" existed?
Similarly I have to ask: What are
Descartes' "clear and distinct ideas". “Clear and distinct” to whom? Him?
His contemporaries? They do not seem to me to be so clear and distinct that I
can base my thinking on them and thus stake my sanity and survival on them. I
know that there are many people now living and many who have lived who do not,
or did not, know what he was talking about. Not in any language. Yet they were,
and are, fully human people. Many of Descartes’ favorite “clear and distinct
ideas”, namely the basic ideas of arithmetic and geometry, are unknown in some
cultures.
This evidence
suggests very strongly to me that Descartes' categories are simply not that
"clear and distinct". If they were inherently obvious to all human
minds, all humans would develop with these ideas built in, a point first noted
by Locke. Looking at a lot of humans, especially ones in other cultures, tells
us that Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas are not built in. We acquire them
by learning them; we are not born with them built in. To me, arguing that they
are somehow real, and that, in the meantime sensory experience is illusory, is
a way of thinking that can then be extended to arguing for the realness of the
creations of fantasy writers. Tolkien describes ents and orcs, and I go along
with the fantasy for as long as it amuses me, but there are no ents, however
much I may enjoy imagining them.
J.R.R. Tolkien
On the contrary,
all concepts are merely mental models that help us to organize our memories in
useful ways, ways that make it easier for us to plan and then act. Even ideas
of numbers, Descartes' favorite “clear” ideas, are merely mental tools that are
more useful than “ents”. Counting things helps us to act more strategically in
the material world and thus to survive. Imagining ents gives us temporary
amusement - not a bad thing, though not nearly as useful as an understanding of
numbers.
But numbers, like ents, are mental
constructs. In reality, there are never two of anything. No two people are exactly
alike, nor are two trees, two rocks, two rivers, or two stars. So then what are
we actually counting? We are counting approximate conceptions built up from memories
of experiences. Concepts far more useful in the survival game than the concept
of an ent. And even those concepts that seem to be built into us (e.g. basic language
concepts) are built in because over generations of evolution of the human
genome, those concepts have given a survival advantage to their carriers.
Language enables teamwork; teamwork works. Thus, as a physically explainable
phenomenon, the human capacity for language also comes back into the fold of
empiricism.
Geneticists can locate the genes that enable a developing embryo to
build a language center in the future child's brain. And later, perhaps, MRI
scanning can find the place in your brain where your "language program"
is located, and, if you have a tumor there, a neuro-surgeon may be able to fix
the "hardware" so a speech therapist can then help you to fix the
program. The human capacity for language is an empirical phenomenon all the way
down. (2.)
In the meantime, counting enabled more
effective hunter-gatherer behavior. If the leader of the tribe knew that he had
seen eight of the things his people called "deer" go into an area of what
they called "bush", and if only seven had come out, he could
calculate that if his friends caught up and circled around in time, and if they
could execute well, work as a team, and kill, this week the children would not starve.
Both the ability to count things, and the ability to articulate detailed
instructions, boosted a primitive tribe’s odds of surviving.
Thus were the
rudiments of arithmetic and language built up in us. And if the pre-cursors of
language seem to be genetically built-in (human toddlers all over the world
grasp that nouns are different from verbs, for example), while the pre-cursors
of math are not, this fact would only indicate that basic language concepts are
far more valuable in the survival game than basic math ones are. It would not
indicate that either basic language concepts or basic arithmetic concepts are
coming to us by some mysterious, inexplicable process out of the ideal
dimension of the pure Good.
We do not have to believe – as the Rationalists
say we do – in another dimension of pure thought, with herds of “forms” or
“distinct ideas” roaming its plains, in order to have confidence in our own ability
to reason. By nature or by nurture, or subtle combinations of the two, we
acquire and pass on to our kids those concepts that enable their carriers to
survive. In short, reason’s roots can be explained in ways that don’t assume
any of the things that Rationalism assumes.
And now, Rationalism’s really disturbing
implications start to occur to us. Wouldn't I love to believe that there is
some hidden dimension in which the "forms" exist, perfect and
eternal? Of course, I would. Then I would "know" that I was
"right". Then I and a few simpatico acquaintances might agree among
ourselves that we were the only people truly capable of perceiving the finer
things in life or of recognizing which are the truly moral acts. Our training
and our natural gifts have sensitized us; we are able to detect the beautiful
and the good. For us to persuade the ignorant masses would be nothing more than
rational. Considering how incapable they really are, why it would be an act of
mercy! Quality people do exist. Of course, they do.
This view is not just theoretically
possible. It was the view of some disciples of G. E. Moore almost a century ago
and, even more blatantly, of some of the followers of Herbert Spencer a
generation before that. (Accessible explanations of the views of Moore and Spencer
can be found in wikipedia articles online.) (3.) (4.)
G.E. Moore
Herbert Spencer
I am being
sarcastic about the sensitivity of those aristocrats, of course. Both my
studies and my experience of the world tell me that there are more than a few
of these kinds of “sensitive” aristocrats roving around in today's world, in
every land. (The "neocons" of the West?) We underestimate them at our
peril. The worst among them don't like democracy. They yearn to be in charge,
they have the brains to get into the positions of authority, and they have the
capacity for life-long fixation on a single goal. Then, they have the ability
to rationalize their way into sincerely believing that harsh and duplicitous measures
are sometimes needed to keep order among the ignorant masses, i.e. everyone
else.
The conclusion
that I came to about rationalism, as a young man, was that it was far too often
a close companion of totalitarianism. The reason why was not clear to me until
I was in my mid-thirties when I learned about cognitive dissonance and how it
works and finally figured the puzzle out.
I see how inclined toward rationalization
other people are and how easily, even insidiously, they give in to it. On what
grounds can I tell myself that I am above this very human weakness? Shall I
tell myself that my mind is somehow more aesthetically and morally aware, or
more disciplined, and is, therefore, immune to such self-delusions? I am aware
of no logical grounds for that kind of conclusion about myself or anyone else
whom I have ever met or whose works I have ever read.
In addition,
evidence which reveals this capacity for rationalization in human minds, even
some of the most brilliant of human minds, litters history. How could Duhem,
the brilliant French philosopher, have written off Relativity Theory just because
a German proposed it? (In 1905, Einstein was thought of as, and thought of
himself as, a German.) How could Heidegger or Heisenberg have endorsed the
Nazi's propaganda? The "Fuehrer" principle. "German
Science" yet!! Ezra Pound, arguably the best literary mind of his time, on
Italian radio defending the Fascists! Decent people today recoil and even
despair.
George Bernard Shaw
Jean-Paul Sartre
How could George Bernard Shaw or Jean-Paul
Sartre have become apologists for Stalinism? So many brilliant minds falling
into this same trap. We have to wonder how so many geniuses of the academic,
scientific, and artistic realms could have made such mistakes in the practical,
everyday one. Once we understand how cognitive dissonance reduction works, the
answer is painfully obvious. Brilliant thinkers are just as brilliant at
self-comforting thinking – namely rationalizing – as they are at clear,
critical thinking. And the most brilliant specious terms and fallacious
arguments that they construct (i.e. the most convincing lies that they tell)
are the ones that they tell themselves. Yes, even these brilliant minds! Look
at the evidence!
The most plausible, cautious, and
responsible reasoning that I can apply to myself leads me to conclude that the
ability to reason skillfully in abstract, formal terms has been a guarantee of
nothing in the realm of practical affairs. Brilliance with formal thinking
systems has been just as quick to advocate for totalitarianism and tyranny as it
has for pluralism and democracy. We are going to have to work out a moral code
that counters at least the worst excesses of the human flaw called “rationalization”,
especially the forms found in the most intelligent of human beings if we want
to survive.
Notes
2. Stark-Vance,
Virginia and Mary Louise Dubay; "100 Questions and Answers About Brain
Tumors"; Josh and Bartlett
Publishers; 2011.
3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G.e._Moore
4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herbert_Spencer
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