Chapter 2. Part B
In the
meantime, attacks aimed specifically at the social sciences are made by
philosophers like John Searle. Taking still another tack, he argues that
physical sciences can be rigorous, but social ones cannot. Social sciences have
to talk about things that are too vaguely defined, and therefore, Searle
claims, the conclusions that studies in the social sciences produce can’t lead to nomothetic,
i.e. law-like, general conclusions at all. (3.). (He and several other critics of social science are
well countered in Harold Kincaid’s book “Philosophical Foundations of the
Social Sciences”.) (4.)
John Searle
In
response to these criticisms, some social scientists have striven to put more
objectivity and empirical rigor into what they do. But they do admit that the
studies done in their fields are often difficult to replicate because relevant
background conditions to the phenomena being studied can’t be re-set. For
example, how could we get a tribe to go back to living as fishers when the fish
species they once lived off of are gone? Could we get a modern nation, or even
a small sub-group in it, to live without their cell phones?
Even a
social scientist’s looking at a group of people changes those people. Some of
the morés of the people being studied then get altered or cease to exist. Social
scientists also admit that the models which guide their research can’t be
expressed in neatly logical terms so the phenomena that the researchers
describe are often not reducible to formulas. In addition, many of the ways in
which a researcher's own biases may influence what she looks for and how she
sees the data seem impossible to forestall, no matter how carefully the studies
are designed. Finally, many human
customs only make sense when they are viewed in the context in which the humans
being studied normally live. Outside of their contexts, human actions often look
pointless. In the Aztec's markets, which kiosks sold batteries? Before they
went overseas, where did the Crusaders get their typhus shots?
Thus,
social scientists admit that they often must settle for a “single print” of any
phenomenon that they wish to study. Societies vary so widely in their beliefs
and morés and keep changing even as we look. There are a lot of prints to study
and more coming all the time; we'll never catch up. And for that matter, how
can any social scientist, who grew up largely inside of one culture, ever claim
to look objectively at another culture?
Others
in the social sciences have taken a more aggressive stance. They have argued
that no science, not even Physics, is truly objective. Complex, culturally-acquired
biases shape all human thinking, even, they say, the thinking of the physicists
and chemists.
Under
this view, moral relativism is the only logical conclusion to be drawn from the
whole body of social science research, or all research in all fields, for that
matter. We can try to observe and study human societies and the belief systems
that they instill in their members, but we can’t pretend to do such work
"objectively". We come to it with eyes already looking to focus on
the details that fit in with the models and values that we absorbed as
children. Each researcher's model of what human society is - or could be,
or should be - lies deeper than his/her ability to articulate thoughts in words
or even simply to observe. Our bias can’t be suspended; it pre-ordains our
ability to think at all.
This is
the stance called "social constructivism". In its view, you use
thought-filters that you absorbed from your culture (parents, siblings,
teachers, etc.), and with these tools, you string together sense data that you
have been taught are the ones that "matter" until, moment by moment,
you form a picture of "reality". But the whole of reality is much
more detailed and complex than the set of sights and sounds that you are paying
attention to. And others, especially others from other cultures, construct
their own pictures of reality. Some of
those pictures will be radically different from yours, but still quite workable.
In
support of this claim, social scientists point out that while careful
descriptions of events in a given society are possible, and even
generalizations about apparent connections between events in that society are
possible, law-like statements about how moral codes and morés for all humans in
all societies work continue to elude us.
Some social scientists go so far as to claim that there aren’t any
“facts” in any of our descriptions of the events of the past, or perhaps even
of the events happening around us now, social or physical. There are only
various “narratives” from various cultures and individuals, any one of them as
valid as any other one. At the highest level of generality then – that is, on
what morality is – many social scientists not only have had nothing to say;
they insist that nothing "factual" - i.e. nothing “objectively true” - can be said.
Marvin Harris
This
argument called the “Science Wars” continues to rage. We can’t go into even
five percent of it here. But the point for us is that Yeats was right: the best
really can lack conviction. They can read about "honor killings", and
remark calmly, "Well, that's their culture." In fact, to many
thinkers in the humanities and social sciences today, all convictions are
temporary and local. (A more recent, sensible, and useful compromise position
is taken by Marvin Harris in "Theories of Culture in Post-Modern
Times".) (5.)
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