Chapter 12. (continued)
Of
course, other civilizations have also had eras during which they were in
ascendancy. In fact, many economic and political signs today indicate that the
dominance of the West may be ending. The new worldview Science is offering and
the values and morés it fosters are so different from the ones out of which the
successes of the West grew that cultures of the West, as they try to adjust, sometimes
seem to be verging on self-destruction. The obsolete parts of the Western worldview
will be replaced, but we must work hard to insure that they are not replaced by
others that simply lead to new forms of injustice. With the problems and
hazards that we have before us now, there doesn’t seem to be much hope for our
species if we can’t do this work.
Discussing
the moral implications of the worldview offered by the new Science, and the New
Physics in particular, will be the business of my next two chapters. I will
present a moral code and an argument for it that is not as all-encompassing as
Hegel’s but is more useful. The theory of morality presented in the remainder
of this book offers some firmer measures by which we can design our actions.
Karl Popper
However,
this new theory will not satisfy the demands of the most exacting philosophers,
such as, for example, Karl Popper and his disciples.1 Popper loved
the physical sciences and considered them to be models of what science should
be, but he found Biology disappointing because he felt its foundational
theories (notably the theory of evolution) could not be tested in neat, clear
ways to see whether they could be falsified. He wrote off the social sciences
pretty much completely.
Popper
argued that only theories that can be tested in ways that risk their being falsified
deserve to be called science. For example, he was deeply impressed by the theory
of relativity, because it could be tested definitively. If it had failed to
predict Eddington’s observations of the stars visible during a full solar
eclipse, the theory would have been viewed as a failure. But it succeeded
brilliantly, and Einstein’s international reputation soared.
Biology
is not that neat. The theory of evolution can be tested only in ways that, if
successful, may make it seem more likely to be true. In his early work, Popper
did not even want to call Biology a science. But gradually, over years, he came
to concede that some theories could make probabilistic, Bayesian kinds of
predictions rather than neat, causally linked ones and could still be rigorous
enough to be properly called scientific. The psychological theories of Adler
and the historical ones of Marx weren’t useful, but Popper came to see that the
theory of evolution was.2
We
accept now that the history of life does not proceed by
cause-and-effect steps as they are pictured under the Enlightenment world view.
Instead, life proceeds forward through time like a river, with many branches
and tributaries connecting to the main channel. The difference is that life
flows uphill. It flows against the gradient of entropy, opportunistically
searching for new habitats in which some new species or new ways of life may
take root, adapt, and flourish. This is a better metaphor for describing how
life moves across time.
Under
this model, the life flow keep bifurcating. Some forks take detours and some are
blocked completely and die out. Whether a given branch will surface further on
in the natural history of the world is dependent on many odds-governed factors
such as changing climates and mutation rates of other species (especially those
that are its food, its competition, and its predators). But the entire system
keeps expanding relentlessly, as is shown by the way the amount of biomass on our
planet has been increasing since life began here about three billion years ago.
While
the model of human cultural evolution presented in the rest of this book will
not satisfy Popper’s most rigorous early demands, it will do what we need it to
do. It will give us categories and guidelines that will lead us toward lifestyles with better
odds of our surviving over the long term.
Notes
1.
Karl Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations,” in Martin Curd and J.A.
Cover, Philosophy of Science: The Central
Issues (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Co., 1998).
2. Mark
Isaak, ed., Index to Creationist Claims, The
Talk Origins Archive, 2005. http://www.talkorigins.org/indexcc/CA/CA211_1.html.
No comments:
Post a Comment
What are your thoughts now? Comment and I will reply. I promise.